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PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 
(CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (AMENDMENT) BILL 1995) 
 
 
By Philippe Boulle 
THE  CRIMINAL  JUSTICE  SYSTEM 
  
LET HISTORY LIGHT OUR  WAY FORWARD 
  
To:       All my colleagues of the Bar and to everyone concerned with 
Justice in Seychelles 
  
I believe that the time is appropriate to publish once again the paper on The 
Criminal Procedure Code which I presented in 1995 to colleagues and members of 
parliament in an effort to avoid proposed amendments to our Criminal Procedure 
Code in 1995 (Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill 1995) which aimed to 
extend the period that suspect could be held in police custody without charge 
from 24 hours to 28 days. The intervention which was supported by other 
members of the legal profession had limited success to the extent that the 
proposed 28 days was reduced to 7 days as amended by the Criminal Procedure 
Code (Amendment) Act 1995. Regrettably the argument and reasoning soon 
faded and later the legislature fell once more in the same trap and they were 
made to believe that the 7 days was insufficient and that they should go and pass 
a new law to increase the detention to a shocking 30 days as per Criminal 
Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 2008. 
  
Gradually as was predicted, professional investigation was abandoned by the 
police who armed with such powers, became arrogant, abusive and decadent, 
finding it easier to rely on brute force to investigate crime as it was easier to 
force a confession from a suspect who had been placed in their custody and at 
their mercy in a cell for 30 days, than do professional investigation. The Courts 
sadly took a misconceived lead from the legislature and in a regrettable 
complicity granted almost automatic extension of custody at the request of police 
officers so that 30 days became the norm rather than the exception which 
lawyers had hoped for and expected from the Courts as the ultimate guardians of 
rights.  In the face of increased criminality in Seychelles and continuing abuse by 
police officer and prison wardens, I leave it to all to distil from the paper the 
guidance they find helpful for the future. 
  
The proposition of law and the legal authorities cited remain valid and in most 
part applicable and relevant even in the light of the above amendments and I 
hope will be of assistance to lawyers and the judiciary. I also trust that with 
hindsight we can all understand our responsibilities and role in saving the 
Seychellois people from the orgies of abuse that have become part of our system 
since the enactment of the abovementioned legislation, which have lead to the 
sad irony of death of citizens in the hands of the police whose mandate is to 
preserve life. 
  
Victoria, the 19th day of March 2010. 
  
Philippe Boullé 
 
---------------------------------------- 
COMMENTS ON THE LEGALITY, CONSTITUTIONALITY AND DESIRABILITY 
OF THE AMENDMENTS RELATING TO DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE 
  
  
Before proceeding to analyse the proposed amendments to Section 100(1) and 
101(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, it would be of help to understand the 
evolution and modern trends with regard to acceptable time limits for detention of 
persons without charge which can be found in most text books on Criminal law 
and for which purpose I recommend Cases and Materials on the English Legal 
System by Michael Zander, 5th Edition, pages 182 to 187 (copy attached) which 
provides the required insight. 
  
I have no doubt that anyone trained in the Commonwealth tradition to attach 
great value to the liberty of the subject, would be immediately shocked at the 
attempt to substitute days and weeks  for the hours permissible to place persons 
in detention without charge. 
  
As we see from the abovementioned extract, modern countries who aspire to the 
rule of law are advocating a reduction in the period of detention without charge to 
only a few hours, in an effort to place enhanced value on the fundamental rights 
of the individual to liberty. 
  
At this juncture in our transition to a democratic society which has espoused a Bill 
of Rights, it is incomprehensible that we should contemplate a shift from a few 
hours permitted for detention without charge to periods in excess of 24 hours and 
up to 4 weeks. 
  
There is regrettably a measure of confusion as to the state of our laws on the 
subject in view of the existence of two conflicting judgments of the Supreme 
Court on the relevant legal provisions. Under the circumstances, it burdens us to 
make a choice between the said judgments in an effort to bring this vital area of 
law into a clear light. Before referring to the aforementioned judgments I would 
like to address certain jurisprudential issues which may shed some light on, and I 
hope assist in a critical evaluation of the said judgments. 
 
  
  
  
1.                     RULE OF LAW 
  
I have often heard people say that they know that someone is guilty but as there 
is no proof, that person cannot be convicted and is regrettably free. This view 
appears innocent on the face of it, but if fed with uncontrolled desire for revenge 
can turn into one of the most dangerous threats to the rule of law and the first 
step towards despotism. 
  
Under the rule of law the word "guilty" means that there is “proof” which 
is "admissible" to convict a person of an offence, and if there is insufficient proof 
or proof that is not admissible, the person is not guilty, let alone the fact that he 
is presumed innocent. 
  
Where there is absence of the rule of law any "act" which "offends", regardless of 
the definition of the offence or proof thereof, is visited with guilt and punishment. 
  
Thus, guilty under a rule of law means simply "guilty in the eyes of the law". 
  
There may be a fine line but the difference is that of day and night. When a 
person has to go free under the rule of law even if one believes he should be 
punished, remember that it is those same rules that have permitted us to acquire 
the goods which tempt the burglar. In other words "you cannot have your cake 
and eat it". 
  
2.      STATE OF EMERGENCY 
  
The proposed amendments which will introduce a power to detain without charge 
up to 28 days is nothing but the introduction of State of Emergency powers by the 
back door, as the only legal consequence of a State of Emergency under our 
Constitution and for that matter under most Commonwealth Constitutions is to 
legalize detention without charge for prolonged periods. 
  
3.      ABUSE 
  
A statute within the criminal law is too often viewed in its narrow, short-term 
context as to whether it could assist to catch a couple of criminals engaged in a 
prevailing crime.   
 
The hallmark of good legislation is that it should not create powers which could be 
abused. 
A simple glance at the proposed amendments will show that when such power 
falls in thehands of an undesirable police officer and an accommodating 
Magistrate a chariot and horse may be drawn through our rights to liberty. 
My personal test is a simple one, i.e. can a citizen be arrested without a warrant 
and held  
in a police cell without charge for 28 days without difficulty, if he offended 
the Commissioner of Police or his superiors and the political or social climate was 
opportune, and it was politically expedient to do so. The answer in my opinion is 
a simple YES, and thus the legislation fails the test of safeguarding the liberty of 
the subject. 
  
4.      ARREST 
People tend to forget far too often that arrest and detention are crimes 
themselves i.e.  
tresspass to the person, assault and false imprisonment which are tolerated to 
combat a  
greater evil in society and therefore made lawful in certain exceptional 
circumstances. 
In the light of the foregoing the legalisation of those crimes has had to be 
circumscribed within very narrow parameters. 
It is much worse that the crimes abovementioned are allowed to be committed in 
its extreme form (i.e. for 28 days) by persons whose action it is most difficult to 
curb, i.e. police and judicial officers, then to have a few crimes e.g. burglary 
against which we have at least a possibility of protecting ourselves using burglar 
bars, dogs, electronic means or security personel. 
  
I will now look at the two judgments (copies attached) referred to earlier, i.e. 
  
          1.  Tirant v. R. Criminal (Bail) No.13 of 1993 (hereinafter referred 
to as the T v. R         judgment)) Judgment 7.10.92 
  
          2.  R. v. Murangira & others No. 17 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 
the R v. M judgment) Ruling 16.6.93. 
 
The two judgments turn mainly upon a different interpretation of 
three    sections            of the 
Criminal Procedure Code which follows:- 
  
S.24             -    When any 
person has been 
taken into custody without a 
warrant for an offence other 
than murder or treason, the 
officer in charge of the police 
station to which such person 
shall be brought may in any 
case and shall, if it does not 
appear practicable to bring 
such person before an 
appropriate court within 
twenty-four hours after he was 
taken into custody, inquire into 
the case, and unless the 
offence appears to  
the officer to be of a serious 
nature, release the person on 
his executing a bond, with or 
without sureties, for a 
reasonable amount to appear 
before  
a court at a time and place to 
be named in the bond; but 
where any person is retained 
in custody  
he shall be brought before a 
court as soon as practicable: 
  
S.70    -    (1)   Where a 
person who has 
been arrested without warrant 
is brought before a court, the 
Judge or Magistrate before 
whom the person is brought 
shall draw up and shall sign a  
formal charge containing a 
statement of the offence with 
which such person is charged, 
unless such a charge shall be 
signed and presented by 
a police officer. 
  
S.100(1) - When any person, 
other than 
any person accused of murder 
or treason, is arrested or 
detained without warrant by an 
officer in charge of a police 
station, or appears or 
is brought before a court, and 
is prepared at anytime while in 
the custody of such officer or 
at any 
 
stage of the proceedings before 
such court to give bail, such 
person may be admitted to 
bail: 
  
Provided that such officer or 
court may, instead of taking bail 
from such person, release him 
on his executing a bond without 
sureties for hisappearance as 
hereinafter provided 
  
(2) -       The amount of bail 
shall be fixed with due regard to 
the circumstances of the case 
and shall not be excessive. 
  
(3) - Notwithstanding anything 
contained in subsection (1), 
the Supreme Court may in 
any case direct that any person 
be admitted to bail or that the 
bail required by the 
Magistrates' Court or a police 
officer be reduced. 
  
These two judgments, should be read carefully to understand fully the issues 
involved. The T v. R judgment was arrived at without considering any authorities 
on the subject, while the R v. M judgment arrived at a conclusion after 
consideration of relevant authorities, and departs from the T v. R judgment to 
conclude at page 15 that “no person is to be remanded in custody without 
having been charged with an offence”. 
  
Having had the opportunity to argue both cases and having had the occasion to 
study both judgments I now wish to add a few more points of interest. 
Put simply, the Murangira case in the final analysis gives effect to the word "shall" 
in S.70  
and finds that where a person arrested without warrant is brought before the 
court under 
S.24 it is mandatory to charge, or release. 
The T v. R judgment says that when a person is brought before a court under 
S.24, the  
word "shall" is not mandatory as the court can exercise discretion to remand 
under S.100 which right to remand is distilled from the right to bail in the said 
section. 
 
At the onset, with the greatest respect, I have been unable to find a rationale to 
underpin the reasoning in the T v. R judgment, but further to that, the finding of 
a power to remand as a complement of the power to bail is unsustainable for the 
following reasons: 
1.          As both the Courts and police officers have power to bail, 
if it is argued  
that this implies a power for Courts to remand then by the same 
token the Police Officer would also have the power to remand, 
which obviously the police does not have. 
2.      If we find a power to remand in S.100 (1) then that power 
becomes  
unlimited in time. Can we imagine a statute that gave a court 
power to remand a person without charge for an unlimited 
period, which furthermore would place a suspect in a worse 
position than a person who is charged, as the latter can 
demand a fair trial within a reasonable time (to prove his 
innocence) or plead guilty (to receive a non-custodial sentence) 
to end his detention. 
3.      Is it reasonable that we should find a power "implied" in a 
criminal  
procedure to remand a suspect indefinitely which is found in no 
otherCommonwealth jurisdiction bearing in mind that the 15 
days limit in CPC S.179 applies only to "accused" persons. 
  
To arrive at a judicious conclusion I believe that it would be helpful to explore the 
origins of S.24 and its place in our own statute books, together with the rich 
precedents that surround its continued existence. 
  
S.24 of the Seychelles Criminal Procedure Code is the equivalent of the English 
provisions  
found in S.38 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1952 which traces its origins to S.38 
of the  
Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, S.22 of the Criminal Justice Amendment 
Act 1914 and 
S.45 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925. 
  
S.38(4) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1952 provides 
  
"where a person is taken into custody for an offence without a 
warrant and is retained in custody, he shall be brought before a 
magistrate court as soon as practicable". 
 
S.24 of the Seychelles Criminal Procedure Code reproduces S.38 (4) of the 
Magistrates Court Act 1952 as follows: 
  
“When any person has been taken into custody without a warrant for 
an offence other than murder or treason ..................... but where 
any person is retained in custody he shall be brought before a court as soon 
as practicable”. 
While the subject has been well and judiciously treated by the Learned Chief 
Justice in the R v. M judgment I will attempt to rehearse the relevant issues in a 
manner which is less formal for the purpose of debate, as I may permit myself to 
do so, being free from the constraints imposed on one writing a judgment. 
  
As can be expected, that legal provision which impacts on the liberty of the 
subject (which is, per Dalton's County Justice, page 406, “a thing specially 
favoured by the common law”) has exercised the highest court in the United 
Kingdom in all its various aspects and from all angles. 
  
The case law surrounding S.38 (4) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1952 is 
abundant andenlightening and revolves around three major shortcomings or 
ambiguities as follows: 
  
Firstly:           The section did not invest the police officer 
with a right to release the suspect. 
  
Secondly:       The definition of "as soon as practicable" is vague. 
  
Thirdly:          S.38 (4) Magistrates Courts Act 1952 did not 
state whether the person brought before the court had to be 
charged. 
  
While it is only the third point which is relevant to our deliberations, I will review 
the manner in which all three issues were settled, as it is not only interesting 
from an academic point of view but also goes to show the manner in which the 
Courts have repulsed all attempts to dilute the traditional value which the 
common law attaches to the liberty of the subject and which is jealously guarded 
by the judiciary. 
 
1.       Right of Release 
  
That point was decided by the Court of Appeal in the case of Wiltshire v. 
Barrett [1966] 1 QB. Lord Denning M.R. (page 325) dealt with the point as 
follows: 
  
"I think there is a short answer to all this argument Section 38 is dealing 
only with cases of two kinds: (1) those cases where the inquiry at the police 
station discloses a case to be answered, and (2) those cases where the 
inquiry cannot be completed forthwith. The section does not mention cases 
of a third kind, namely, those cases where on inquiry at the police station it 
appears that there is no sufficient ground on which to proceed further 
against the man. Clearly, in those cases, the man should be released 
forthwith. There was no need in the statute to mention that contingency. It 
is too obvious for words ". 
  
And Lord Justice Salmon concluded (page 334) thus: 
  
“Indeed, as Lord Denning M.R. has pointed out, it has long been settled 
law that in such circumstances there is not only the right but the duty to let 
the arrested man go free. Had it not been for the finding of the judge and 
Mr. Fay's skillful submission, I should have thought that this second point 
was so obviously bad as to be virtually unarguable” 
  
2.       As soon as practicable 
  
Several judgments closed all arguments on that point in no uncertain terms 
as follows: 
  
1.         Hudson (1981) Cr. App Rep. Vol.72 at page 168: 
“It is implicit in the section that being brought before a Magistrates'  
Court” as soon as practicable” must mean something similar to the 
24  
hours mentioned in subsection (1). In our view this probably 
required  
the appellant having been arrested to be brought before a Magistrate 
on  
Monday morning, which would be 24 hours after he was arrested, 
but  
would certainly require him to be brought before a Magistrate on the  
Tuesday morning, which would be 48 hours after his arrest. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2.         R. v. Holmes (1981) 2 ALL E.R. at page 615: 
  
“In both R v Houghton (1978) 68 Cr App R 197 at 205 and in R v  
Hudson (1980) Times, 29th October it was I think accepted that save 
in a wholly exceptional case the period between arrest and 
appearance before a Magistrates' Court should not exceed 48 hours. 
The same approach seems to have been adopted in the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976. The Act abrogates 
S.38 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1952 where it applies but only 
permits detention in right of an arrest exceeding 48 hours if the 
Secretary of State extends this period. This seems to me to point 
unmistakably to a period of 48 hours as being the maximum 
permissible period of detention in right of an arrest in the absence of 
special statutory provision”. 
  
And at page 616: 
  
“The arrested person has to be bailed or brought before a 
Magistrates'  
Court “as soon as practicable”. Practicability is obviously a slightly  
elastic concept which must take account of the availability of police  
manpower, transport and Magistrates' Court. It will also have to 
take  
account of any unavoidable delays in obtaining sufficient evidence to  
charge, but this latter factor has to be assessed in the light of the 
power  
of the police to release on bail conditioned by a requirement to 
return to  
the arrest when the evidence is more nearly sufficient. Any such 
release  
may involve a risk that the arrested person will abscond, commit 
further  
crimes or interfere with witnesses, but this risk has to be balanced  
against the vital consideration that no man is to be deprived of his  
liberty save in accordance with the law. “As soon as practicable” still 
means “within about 48 hours at most”.” 
  
3.       Charge 
  
This point was likewise put to rest by the same authorities cited 
above.                 R.v. Holmes     (1981)  2          ALL E.R. Donaldson L.J at 
page 615      refers to thisambiguity thus: 
  
  
  
“Curiously enough, S.38 of the 1952 Act makes no mention of the 
preferment of a charge as a precondition of bringing the arrested person 
before a Magistrates' Court. However, the commissioner takes the view that 
this is the position and I know that many lawyers would agree with him”. 
  
In Hudson (1981) Cr. App. Rep Vol.72 the Court of Appeal in less sarcastic 
but more blunt and categorical terms, at page168, also dealt with this 
issue: 
  
"We next consider the provisions of section 38 of the Magistrates' Courts 
Act 1952. Section 38 deals with bail on arrest without warrant. Subsection 
(1) deals with offences which are not very serious and if it is not possible to 
bring the person before a Magistrates' Court within 24 hours after his being 
taken into custody allows him to be released on bail. Subsection (2) deals 
with the situation where the inquiry into the case cannot be completed 
forthwith and allows the person to be bailed. And then subsection (4) 
provides: “Where a person is taken into custody for an offence without a 
warrant and is retained in custody, he shall be brought before a Magistrates' 
Court as soon aspracticable”. Of course when such a person is brought 
before a Magistrates Court he has to be charged with some 
offence" (underlining is mine) 
  
And at page 169: 
  
"If the proper processes of law were to be followed the officers should 
have brought him before a Court at the very least 48 hours on a 
charge (underlining is mine) 
In Houghton and Francoisy (1979) Cr. App Rep at page 198, the Court of 
Appealreminded police officers involved with that case of the implications of 
S38(4) of the Magistrates Courts Act 1952 as follows: 
“Having made an arrest for a specific offence, they can hold the arrested 
man in custody whilst they make inquiries; but when they have enough 
evidence to prefer a charge they should do so without delay and comply 
with section 38 (4) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952” 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
And at page 205: 
"Houghton should have been charged not later than Monday, July 5 
and brought before the Justices that day. Mr. Suckling on behalf of the 
Crown accepted before us that the police had been in breach of S.38 (4) ". 
  
Finally, the need to charge had even prior to the Magistrates Courts 
Act 1952, been well settled in law so that we find in the speech of Lord du 
Parcq in the landmark case of Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] A.C. 573 at 
page 575 the following dictum: 
  
"Finally the duty to make a definite charge against a person who has 
been arrested without a warrant has been impliedly affirmed by the 
legislature, S.22 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914 which 
replaced S.38 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 ……" 
  
While the position in United Kingdom rested on settled precedents in view of the 
strict  
stare decisis rule, in Seychelles the authorities found it prudent to entrench it in 
our law  
and hence we find in our Criminal Procedure Code special provision which deals 
with: 
  
a)      The right to release               -        found in the proviso to 
S.24     as follows: "Provided that an officer of a police station may 
release a person  
arrested on suspicion on a charge of committing any offence, 
when after due police inquiry, insufficient evidence is, in his 
opinion, disclosed on which to proceed with the charge". 
  
b)      The need to charge                -        as clearly set out in 
S.74          referred to earlier and which puts the entire matter beyond 
doubt. 
This brief overview of the case law, I trust, will suffice to justify endorsing the R 
v. M judgment, which I hasten to add, also stands very firmly on its own judicially 
sound reasoning. 
It is not surprising to note from our Criminal Procedure Code, which has taken 
great care  
to state the period and place of remand for persons charged with offences to 
afford adequate protection to the "accused"      (e.g. 
Sections            179,     195      and 198), that not a singleprovision is made to 
safeguard a mere "suspect" who would obviously be much more in need of 
protection from abuse to extract confessions and obtain relevant information had 
they been susceptible to remand. 
  
The reason for the above is as simple as it is logical, that no such remand before 
charge was ever permitted or contemplated. The forms provided for remand 
(copies of which are attached) also carry the same message, loud and clear. 
The T v. R judgment with all good intentions, with respect, went too far to assist 
the police to bring criminals to justice and thus lost sight of the human rights 
dimension, and in this context the following words of Lord Simon in the case 
CHRISTIE v. LEACHINSKY [1947] A.C at page 595, remains a beacon of light, “My 
Lords, the liberty of the subject and the convenience of the police or any other 
executive authority are not to be weighed in the scales against each other.” 
  
The echoes of the words of Lord Simon have reverberated throughout the years 
to this date and 30 years later Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Spicer v. Holt 
(H.L.(E)) [1977] A.C at page 1013 echoed the same statement, (when he had to 
let an accused driver go free,) in the following terms: 
  
"The construction for which the driver contends, and which I think is correct, 
leads to a result which it regards as absurd but, speaking for myself, my 
reluctance is modified where, as in the present case, the issue is one which 
touches the important constitutional right of personal liberty". 
 
FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL POINT OF VIEW 
  
Article 18(5) of the Constitution reads as follows: 
  
"A person who is arrested or detained, if not released, shall be produced before 
a Court within twenty-four hours of the arrest or detention or, having regard to 
the distance from the place of the arrest or detention to the nearest Court or the 
non-availability of a Judge or Magistrate, or force majeure, as soon as is 
reasonably practicable after the arrest or detention ". 
  
The relevant principles and provisions of the laws of the U.K and Seychelles has 
now therefore been enshrined in the Constitution. 
  
It goes without saying that Article 18(5) must be interpreted in the light of those 
statutoryprovisions from which it is derived and the common law principles that 
underpin such laws; Vide Noordally v. Attorney General (1986) MR at page 207. 
  
It is interesting to review the submissions made to the Constitutional 
Commission, to shed even more light on the intention of that quasi-legislative 
body, as to whether it intended todepart from or entrench in the Constitution the 
statutory provisions and common law principles in existence. 
  
These are the relevant extracts from the two written submissions by the parties 
represented in the Constitutional Commission: 
  
  
             1.         "Any person who is arrested or detained - 
  
(a)       for the purpose of bringing him before a court in 
execution of 
the order of a court; or 
  
(b)       upon reasonable grounds for suspicion of his having 
committed, 
or being about to commit, a criminal offence, 
  
and who is not released, shall be brought without delay before a 
court, and if a person arrested or detained as mentioned in 
paragraph (b) is not tried within a reasonable time, then, without 
prejudice to                 
  
  
  
  
  
  
any further proceedings that may be brought against him, he shall 
be  
released either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions,  
including in particular such conditions as are reasonably necessary 
to  
ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for 
proceedings preliminary to trial. " 
(hereinafter referred to as "Submission 1 ") 
2.              "Anyone arrested or detained shall within 24 hours be 
charged and / or brought before a judge or other officer authorised 
by law to exercise judicial power. If they have not been charged 
within that time, the judge or judicial officer shall either charge them 
or order their release" 
  
(hereinafter referred to as "Submission 2") 
  
It is further important to note from the submissions and the debates which 
ensued, that the  
only question that arose therefrom was the choice of the period of 48 or 24 hours 
before  
being brought to court. No suggestion whatsoever was made to depart from the 
need to  
charge before or upon being brought to court which is spelt out in submission 2 
above and  
implied in submission 1, which merely espoused the prevailing statutory 
provisions. 
  
The final draft Constitution adopted Submission 1 by purely personal preference 
of the 
draftman as no arguments (to the best of my recollection) raised the issue of the 
charge. 
  
To appreciate the rationale behind the Constitutional or statutory provisions that  
safeguard the liberty of the subject in this area of the law, we must bear in mind 
the  
ultimate goal which is sought to achieve and which is spelt out by the Privy 
Council in  
Hussein and ors. v. Chang Fook Kam and anor. [1970] A.C. at page 948: "It is 
indeed  
desirable as a general rule that an arrest should not be made until the case is  
complete ". 
  
Arrest is allowed merely as a derogation to the above principle in a delicate 
balancing exercise, with the need to protect the citizen from crime on the one 
hand and the liberty of the subject on the other. 
  
The aim however remains to attempt forever to close the gap between arrest and 
charge  
by all means afforded to society by modern technology, as Lord Diplock reminded 
us in  
Dallison v. Caffery [ 1964] 2 ALL E.R. at page 618 "What was reasonable in 
connexion 
with arrest and detention in the days of the parish constable, the stocks and lock-
up,  
and the justice sitting in his own justice room before there was an organised 
police force, prison system or courts of summary jurisdiction, is not the same as 
what is reasonable to-day ". 
  
  
It is also necessary to understand the purpose for which a person may be 
arrested. There  
seems to be a strange and dangerous new conception which is slowly creeping in 
our  
system, to the effect that the police can arrest so that they can make 
investigation or  
inquiries about a crime and assess the part played by a person detained so that 
they can  
decide upon a specific charge. This false notion aforementioned must be corrected 
at the  
earliest possible to avoid sliding into the system referred to by Viscount Simon in 
Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] A.C. at page 588 as follows: 
"Such a situation may be tolerated under other systems of law, as for instance in 
the  
time of lettres de cachet in the eighteenth century in France, or in more recent 
days  
when the Gestapo swept people off to confinement under an over-riding authority 
which the executive in this country happily does not in ordinary times possess". 
Arrest can only be made for a specific offence, and "the offence to be inquired 
into is the  
offence for which the person has been arrested"; Vide Christie v. Leachinsky, 
above  
cited at page 603 and Hudson [1981] Cr. App. Rep. Vol.72 at page 166. Other 
blunt reminders which followed are: 
  
1.           Houghton [1979] Cr. App. Rep. Vol. 68 at page 205 
  
"We have, however, found cause for grave concern in the answers which 
Commander  
Howard gave to Mr. Blom-Cooper when he was cross-examined about 
Houghton's arrest and detention at Staines police station and to which we have 
referred already in the recital of facts. We wish to state in the clearest possible 
terms that police officers can only arrest for offences. If they think that there is 
any difference between detaining and arresting, they are mistaken. They have no 
power, save under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976, 
to arrest anyone so that they can make inquiries about him. Having made an 
arrest for a specific offence, they can hold the arrested person in custody whilst 
they make inquiries; but when they have enough evidence to prefer a charge 
they should do so without delay and comply with section 38 (4) of the Magistrate 
Court Act 1952" 
  
2.           Lemsatef [1977] 2 ALL E.R at page 836 
  
"It must be clearly understood that neither customs officers, nor police officers 
have  
any right to detain somebody for the purpose of getting them to help with their  
enquiries. Police officers either arrest for an offence or they do not arrest at all.  
Customs officers either detain for an offence or do not detain at all. The law is 
clear.  
Neither arrest nor detention can properly be carried out without the accused 
person  
being told the offence for which he is being arrested There is no such offence 
as "helping with police with their enquiries".... If the idea is getting around 
amongst officer that they can arrest or detain people as the case may be for 
those particular purposes, the sooner they disabuse themselves of that idea the 
better" 
Only after having made an arrest for a specific offence upon reasonable suspicion 
can the  
period of detention i.e. 24 hours be used to dispel or confirm the reasonable 
suspicion by  
questioning the suspect, and per Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke [1984] 1 A.C. at 
page 443 
"When the police have reached the conclusion that prima facie proof of the 
arrested person's guilt is unlikely to be discovered by further inquiries of him or of 
other potential witnesses, it is their duty to release hint from custody ". 
While arrest and detention is still permissible within the narrow confines of 24 or 
48 hours,police officers are to be reminded that even where they have reasonable 
suspicions, theySHOULD NOT ARREST AND DETAIN if the purpose for which 
arrest is permitted can be achieved without arrest, as in cases where the suspect 
is willing to come to the police station and be interviewed, and all that is required 
of a suspect is a simple statement to confirm or dispel suspicion. 
Lastly we should not fall prey to the temptation of thinking that a few breaches of 
human rights exercised on a few individuals will curb or cure the greater ill of 
crime, and we can therefore close our eyes, for this is the first step that was 
taken by every system that sank into orgies of crime be it, the Nazis, the 
communists or the lesser murderous regimes that have plagued our planet. 
The most that can be said for the power of arrest is that it appears to be a 
necessary evil insociety as we know it, although the notion of an evil as a 
necessity is a contradiction; but be that as it may, the task that falls upon all of 
us is to ensure that the aforesaid evil, or crime (i.e arrest and detention) does not 
become a part or the major part of the problem of criminality in our country as it 
is in many other countries. 
 
  
  
  
FROM THE POLICE POINT OF VIEW 
  
Having discussed arrest and detention without charge from a legal and conceptual 
viewpoint it is desirable in order to complete the picture to look at the issue from 
a practical angle in its everyday implementation by the police. 
  
The first criticism which is usually forthcoming for the executive authorities 
against any law that curbs the power of arrest and detention is that it hampers 
the work of the police; while the citizens retort that it protects them against 
abuse. 
Does such law which we find in Commonwealth countries that sometimes reduces 
the detention without charge to less than 24 hours really pose a problem to the 
police and society at large. 
A skillful and well trained officer will tell you that the 24 hours restriction before 
charge certainly does not create any significant problems for many reasons, and I 
will cite only two such reasons for it would take an entire book (which I will leave 
to writers) to go into the options available to operate efficiently within the 
confines of a law which adequately protects the liberty of the subject by 
preventing detention without charge beyond 24 hours. 
  
1.       In many investigations circumstances dictate, (leaving the law 
to one side)that arrests should not be made prematurely. Skillful 
officers always advocate that it is bad procedure to arrest until the 
investigation is nearing completion and most relevant information 
have been gathered. 
The reasoning behind this tactic is that it is always desirable to arrest 
all parties connected with a crime at the same time, to prevent the 
possibility of one alarming the other, to either go into hiding, destroy 
evidence or move stolen goods. 
Many investigations have been bungled because of unskilled, 
overzealous  
young police officers who have made premature arrests, as they had 
not  
been taught the basic skill which teaches one that the best way to 
obtain evidence or information is to allow the criminals to drop their 
guard and  
throw caution to the wind, by giving them no hint that the police is on 
their  
trail. 
To the extent mentioned above the law and practice by a strange  
coincidence, meet in harmony to achieve different but complementary  
aims. 
  
  
  
  
  
2.       Another classical example, which follows, confronts all police 
forces andshows how police officers throughout the civilized world 
have happily embraced the restraints upon them, and have 
concentrated their efforts on improving their skills and coming up with 
novel ideas to win the fight against crime. 
  
Often it happens, especially in connection with crimes committed by 
criminalgangs, that the police would have sufficient evidence to arrest 
a couple of lesser members of the gang but decides not to do so for 
tactical reasonsabovementioned as they would rather arrest the leader 
and his close collaborators, against whom they, as yet, have not a 
shred of evidence, but for the evidence against the lesser members 
which is strong indication that the leader is involved due to the 
enormity of the crime. 
Suddenly the police receives information that the leader will be 
leaving the  
jurisdiction shortly. In the above instance and many other, the police, 
if  
possible will come up with a holding charge, i.e. a genuine charge 
which is  
unconnected to the crime, which allows the police to detain the leader 
for a  
sufficient time to complete the investigation, while on 24 hours 
detention or on remand pending the trial. If released on bail then 
conditions would be  
placed to prevent him leaving the relevant jurisdiction. The charge 
usually  
involves such offences as contravention of immigration laws for which  
gangs are notorious and in the case of Seychelles, we could well 
imagine  
other crimes to which the police turn a blind eye, e.g. renting of 
houses by  
foreigners in contravention of the Immovable Property 
(Transfer Restriction) Act which could come in handy as a holding 
charge to prevent certain persons from escaping the jurisdiction 
pending investigation. An energetic, dynamic and professional police 
force, I am certain could come up with many other convenient holding 
charges as do their colleagues daily in other countries. 
  
When examining the role of the police one cannot overlook the pressure brought 
to bear on them by the public who scream for an immediate pound of flesh after 
each crime and loses sight in moments of uncontrolled anger, of both the human 
rights, the tactical and the operational dimensions. 
  
The anxieties of the public is also focused on a fear that there are criminals at 
large and that the police must act immediately to put them out of circulation, 
adding even more pressure on the police and the executive. 
  
An inefficient and demoralized police force, often will very sadly succumb to 
the pressures abovementioned and round up and detain a few citizens, if only to 
be seen to be doing something and gratify the immediate expectations of a 
restless public, to bolster their flagging image. 
  
  
  
  
  
The inevitable result is that by such rash actions the investigation is jeopardised 
and the real culprits and their ill-gotten goods get away, and the vicious circle is 
perpetrated. Theunfortunate scapegoats are eventually released with a life long 
hatred for the police who islooked upon as the enemy who will never deserve 
their respect and assistance. The few will take legal action against the police for 
unlawful imprisonment, and when they are awarded damages, the police force 
will settle the award and the inefficient force will say, "as we could not have 
caught the criminal anyway, the price we have had to pay to get the public off 
our back was worth it". 
  
Faced with the above scenario, the executive authority, if wanting in power or 
imagination to redress the police force, will simply fall prey to the temptation to 
use more force and violence to combat crime and attempt to change the laws to 
permit such practice. 
An efficient police force will shoulder all those concerns abovementioned and rest 
on long  
term success. Pending investigation, if they do not have sufficient evidence to 
arrest, or if  
for tactical reasons, they do not feel the time is right for an arrest, they will place 
the  
person they feel may have been involved in a crime, under discreet surveillance 
and likewise they will keep watch on buildings which they believe may contain 
instruments of crime or stolen goods to avoid loss of incriminating material or 
valuable property of the victim, until the investigation is ripe for an arrest. 
  
The results are those spectacular arrests which we have witnessed in such 
incidents as thebombing of the World Trade Center in America and others when 
the police has had to identify a few individuals among many millions. 
  
At the end of the day if a criminal passes through the net despite all efforts we 
should have the wisdom to repeat the words of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, quoted 
above "My reluctance" (to let the driver go) "is modified where as in the 
present case, the issue is one which touches the important constitutional 
right to liberty". 
  
Finally, we cannot underestimate the benefits which accrue from respecting the 
individual'sright to liberty by the police, through a greater respect for the police 
by the public who because of this respect will be even more willing to assist the 
police who they will see as an ally against crime. Respect even from the criminals 
and the resulting assistance from members of the public which must be earned 
with reciprocal respect for the individual is without doubt the most powerful tool 
against crime which any police force can have, and it transcends all laws. 
 
  
  
  
COMMENTS ON DRAFT BILL 
  
The draft Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill, 1995, which seeks to 
amend S.100 (1) and S.101 (1) to introduce the concept of detention without 
charge beyond the 24 hour limit, is so at odds with common law and 
Commonwealth principles and procedures that it is not surprising to see so many 
contradictions within the draft itself, a few of which I shall attempt to elucidate: 
  
1.           A person has a constitutional right to liberty and security of 
the personunder Article 18 of the Constitution which forbids his arrest 
and detention, subject to strict limitations. How can he need a 
statutory "right to be released" (draft S.100 (i)) when possessed of a 
fundamental right not to be arrested or detained in the first place. It is 
the person arresting or detaining who needs a statutory right to do so 
and that right must be limited in such a way that it falls within the 
ambit of the derogations to Article 24(1). This right to liberty was well 
pronounced in Noordally v. A.G. (1986) M.R. page 207 as follows “the 
suspects remaining at large is the rule, his detention on ground 
of suspicion is the exception”. Thus the right to be released is but 
a redundant and confusing legal concept. At best all parties concerned 
could have been reminded of the duty to release the suspect. 
  
2.       Article       18 (5) of the Constitution has clearly stipulated the 
time limit forbringing persons detained before a court, i.e 
within          24 hours or if distance,availability of judge or force 
majeur does not permit that, then as soon asreasonable practicable 
after detention. The proposed amendment which seeks to extend the 
period of 24 hours is therefore ultra vires. 
  
3.       In S. 100(4) we see the creation of an illusionary and empty 
right. How can  
we talk of the need for a warrant and then give a blank cheque to the 
police, by  
such derogation as "unless new evidence justifying a further arrest has 
to comelight since the suspect was released", when this is the only 
reason that would "justify a further arrest" under a warrant itself. 
4.       In S.101 (1) the word "remand" by court is unknown to the 
common law  
with regard to persons who have not been charged. Remand only 
applies topersons charged and awaiting trial. This can only infuse 
confusion into the criminal law. 
 
  
  
Jurisdictions which have condoned these kind of atrocities, i.e. detention 
of persons without charge for long periods, have called it "preventive detention" 
or plain "detention", therefore let us be consistent with terminology so that at 
least we will be talking the same language as the rest of the world. 
5.         Under Section 101(3) & (4) we are invited to consider a 
scenario where a  
citizen is brought before a court without a charge and the court will 
remand theperson in custody, "if there are substantial grounds for 
believing that the suspect will fail to appear for his trial". How on earth 
can the court possibly contemplate a trial when the person is not even 
charged with an offence, worse still that he "will otherwise obstruct 
the course of justice" when he is not even charged and the only thing 
being interfered with till then is his right to liberty and his presumption 
of innocence. 
6.         When we look at the conditions under which a citizen who has 
not even  
been charged with an offence is to be released under S.100 (7) (a) we 
begin towonder seriously whether the proposed Bill departs only from 
the common law, or simply from all logic or commonsense. 
  
An innocent person who has not been charged and has languished in a 
police cell possibly for weeks will finally be released on condition, "that 
he does not commitan offence" or "obstruct the course of justice", and 
the condition will attach to him indefinitely. 
  
What happens if our suspect commits an offence? Of course to satisfy 
a breach of the condition he must be found guilty of an offence. Is he 
then punished for the offence and for contempt of court, even though 
he may have had this condition appended to his existence only 
because he was once upon a time arrested for anoffence for which he 
was never charged and for which the law presumes him to beinnocent; 
not to mention that a traffic offence will suffice to put him in contempt 
of the Court. 
  
Until I read this Bill I thought that our Constitutional right to liberty 
was conditional upon not committing certain offences punishable by 
imprisonment. If that is so, why should we, and what right do we 
bestow on ourselves, to create a group of second class citizens who 
will be in double jeopardy if they commit an offence i.e they will fall 
foul of both the law and the Court order and be further penalised twice 
for committing an offence because once upon a time they were a mere 
suspect, rightly or wrongly, and maliciously or not brought before a 
Court. 
  
  
  
  
7.       Under S.101(7)(b) matters get even more draconian leading us 
back to the  
days of the inquisition; the "suspect" still not charged, will be forced 
by a Court  
order to ENABLE inquiries or a report to be made for his eventual 
conviction and"ASSIST the Court" to convict him. At that point I 
thought I was reading a horror story in which the presumption of 
innocence, the right to defend oneself, the right to remain silent and 
the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself had all been cast to 
the wind by the stroke of a pen. 
8.       Under S.101(7)(c) a citizen can be prevented from leaving the 
country  
indefinitely because he is a suspect, let alone for the purpose of 
attending a trialfor an offence in respect of which he has not yet been 
charged. Is this how low wepeg the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. 
 
  
  
  
  
  
CONCLUSION 
  
In the final analysis all I can see in the Draft Bill is an attempt to sacrifice human 
dignity,freedom and liberty on the alter of an inefficient, unskilled and 
demoralized police force who has failed to combat crime using civilized means 
accepted and adopted by other peaceful Commonwealth countries. Reading that 
Bill finally reminded me that indeed the dividing line between the rule of law and 
arbitrary rule is a fine line and how easily it is to cross that line blindly, unless 
you have had occasion to lose your own fundamental human rights, and come to 
appreciate their true worth, purpose and meaning. 
  
You who would think that, the Draft Bill is for criminals, humble yourself for no 
bad law has ever chosen its victim; and the prisons continue to harbour and in 
the graveyards of this world there rests, many who have suffered "unjust" 
imprisonment or death under such laws they legislated "for others" at a 
convenient time.  
Victoria 31st March 1995 
 
Editor's Note: In the wake of amendments made to the Criminal Procedure Code 
in 2009 effectively increasing the duration of time in which a suspect may be 
detained without charge, the arguments set forth in this article have once again 
come to the fore. 
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